The Whelk logic has been proposed as a foundation for logic program synthesis. Here, I interpret the rules of Whelk as rules of rst-order logic and derive them in Isabelle. Theoretically, this provides a means to understand the meta-theory behind Whelk, and its correctness. The interpretation suggests simpli cations, corrections, and extensions. Practically, it provides a way to construct logic programs from proofs of their correctness by applying the formalized proof rules using higher-order resolution.
Introduction
Background I have used Isabelle, a logical framework supporting proof construction by higher-order resolution, as a tool to reconstruct, simplify, implement, and use a proposed logic. The logic is Whelk, developed by Geraint Wiggins in 20], which represents an adaptation of the proofs-as-programs idea to logic program synthesis; the logic has been implemented and is in use at Edinburgh and other Universities. The Isabelle theory, which I call IsaWhelk, has functionality similar to Whelk, but is formally veri ed and very simple to understand.
In 20], Whelk is presented as a new kind of logic where speci cations are manipulated in a special kind of \tagged" formal system. A tagged formula A is of the form A]] P(x)$ . 1 The tag subscript represents a pure logic program 4] where P is an atom and a formula in a restricted subset of rst-order logic. The Whelk logic manipulates these tags so that the tagged (subscripted) program should satisfy two properties. First, the tagged program should be logically equivalent to formula it tags in the appropriate rst-order theory. To achieve this the proof rules state how to build programs for a given goal from programs corresponding to the subgoals. Second, the tagged program should be decidable, which means as a program it terminates in all-ground mode. One other feature of Whelk is that a proof may begin with a subformula of the starting goal labeled by a special operator @ . At the end of the proof the Whelk system extracts the tagged program labeling this goal; hence Whelk may be used to synthesize logic programs. In my interpretation I replace the tagging mechanism by formulating tagged rules directly as equivalences between speci cations and program schemas; hence, the Whelk rules constitute a simple calculus for manipulating equivalences. I have used Isabelle to derive these rules in the appropriate rst-order theory or, in several cases, to uncover aws in proposed rules. Under this interpretation, the tagged formula in the starting speci cation is translated to an equivalence between the speci cation and a meta-variable which is later incrementally instantiated to a program during resolution with the proof rules. I have used Isabelle's higher-order resolution facility to use these rules to synthesize programs in the manner of Whelk.
Motivation and Contributions
My motivations are twofold. First, I am interested in applying frameworks like Isabelle to implement veri cation and synthesis calculi where higher-order uni cation can be used to construct programs during proof 1, 2] . Second, to understand appropriate frameworks and techniques to automate the synthesis of logic programs. In 10, 11] , we show how second-order uni cation combined with rewriting can be used to automatically synthesize logic programs from correctness proofs. This case study combines these motives, recasting Whelk directly as a set of rules in rst-order logic where programs may be synthesized using higher-order uni cation.
This kind of formalization should be of interest to researchers working in logic programming, mechanized reasoning, and formal methods. First, just as formally developing and reasoning about the correctness of programs on a computer is worthwhile, so is the formalization of programming logics themselves and the analysis of their correctness. This work demonstrates how we may use a logical framework like Isabelle to formally study and give a machine checked account of the proof rules of a proposed logical system. My interpretation recasts each Whelk rule into an Isabelle rule which I show to be derivable. The correctness of the proposed logic can thereby be established with respect to the equivalence criteria above.
My second contribution is pedagogical: the interpretation simpli es and clari es. Rather than formalizing the notation of Whelk directly I explain it using concepts available in the Isabelle theory. Tagging is accomplished by replacing tags with explicit equivalences in the relevant formulas. Extraction is accomplished via meta-variable instantiation. And whereas Whelk manipulates environments of parameter variables when reasoning about quanti ers, my approach instead uses higher-order uni cation to manipulate and propagate these variables in a uniform way. As well as simplifying, the interpretation brings us back to the familiar mathematical setting of rst-order logic where questions of derivability and correctness may be treated using conventional and well understood means. The interpretation quickly exposed problems: some of the Whelk rules were invalid. Of course, these defects were present in the original Whelk theory, but their presence there is perhaps harder to ascertain.
This second contribution leads into the third: the interpretation provides a clear illustration of the ideas behind schematic proofs developed in 1]. The idea there is that many logics designed for program synthesis and transformation can be recast in within a logical framework like Isabelle (or ELF 18]) whereby higher-order uni cation is used to construct programs during proofs. This idea of unifying veri cation and synthesis through metavariables is not new. It goes back to Green's use of resolution not only for checking answers to queries, but also for synthesizing programs 9] . But what is surprising is that, cast in a higherorder setting, many di erent appearing calculi and synthesis techniques can be explained and simpli ed using this idea. Whelk is one such calculus. Related work in logic program synthesis is 10, 11] , which has looked at using higher-order (pattern) uni cation as a means of \middle-out" synthesizing logic programs; Whelk is seen as an alternative to this approach. This work demonstrates that the two development methodologies are essentially the same.
Finally, this reconstruction demonstrates the practical bene ts of using systems like Isabelle to implement such a synthesis calculus. Not only could I use Isabelle's higher-order uni cation to synthesize programs, I could also use the normalization and simpli cation tactics that are distributed with the system. I used these routines both to verify the translated Whelk rules, usually fully automatically, and also to construct synthesis proofs. For example, the subset theorem required only 15 
Overview of Whelk
The following summarizes 20] . Whelk is a sequent calculus implemented in Prolog. Its logical basis is constructive sorted rst-order logic with equality, extended with an operator @ and rules for reasoning about @ . Whelk proofs begin with a speci cation conjecture of the form 8x:@ S(x) where S is some formula, not involving @ , possibily containing the x i in the list of variables x. At the end of the proof, a program named P is extracted that is equivalent to the speci cation within the @ operator, i.e., 8x:S(x) $ P(x).
The Whelk rules are formulated top-down (\re nement style") and formulas are tagged; the tags explain how to build the extraction. 20] does not list all the rules for Whelk, only those necessary for the given example. These rules are summarized in my Appendix A. Whelk rules are designed to produce programs equivalent to their speci cations. The program is built using tagging information which is not displayed during proof. The constructed programs are represented as formulas in a programming logic L P which is distinct from the speci cation logic L S . The programming logic is not fully de ned but basically it is a subset of the speci cation logic where sorts are omitted as well as logical operators like negation (which is considered undesirable in logic programs). At the end of a Whelk proof, a pure logic program in L P is constructed. These are universally quanti ed equivalences between an atom (the program name) and a program body where the body is a formula in the language L P ; they are similar to the logic descriptions of 7] . For example, the following is a pure logic program for list membership (where cons is \."). Such programs can be translated to Horn clauses or run directly in a programming language like G odel.
Overview of Isabelle
Isabelle is an interactive theorem prover developed by Larry Paulson at Cambridge. It is a logical framework; this means its logic is used as a meta-logic in which object logics (e.g., rst-order logic, set theory, etc.) are encoded. Proofs are interactively constructed by applying proof rules using higher-order resolution. Proof construction may be automated using tactics which are ML programs in the tradition of LCF 8] that construct proofs.
Isabelle provides a ne basis for this work. First, since it is a logical framework, I could select an object logic appropriate for my interpretation. Fortunately, Isabelle is distributed with a constructive rst-order logic with equality, similar to Whelk (without @ ); this spared me encoding this logic myself. This theory also came with well-developed tactic support for rewriting and simpli cation. Moreover, as Isabelle's metalogic is based on higher-order logic, it can formalize proof rules which are both hypothetical (depending on other formulas) or schematic (generalized over formulas); i.e., one can express and derive proof rules, and I used this to derive equivalents of the Whelk rules. Rules in Isabelle, primitive and derived, may be applied with higher-order uni cation where higher-order meta-variables may occur not only in proof rules, but also in the proof as well. I used this to construct proofs that built pure logic programs (as in Whelk) where the program was originally left unspeci ed as a higher-order meta-variable and lled in incrementally during the resolution steps. Hence Whelk extraction corresponds to a substitution instance.
Isabelle manipulates objects of the form 4 |F1; ...; Fn|] ==> F where formulas may be schematic (contain metavariables). The symbol ==> is meta-level implication and the above represents the formula F1 ==> (... ==> (Fn ==> F)...) in Isabelle's metalogic, which is a fragment of higher-order logic. (The reader should not confuse Isabelle's implication, ==>, with implication in the object logic, or its higher-order universal quanti er \!!" with quanti ers in the object logic.) A proof in Isabelle proceeds by applying rules to such formulas which result in zero or more subgoals, possibly with di erent assumptions. When there are no more subgoals, the proof is complete.
Note that although proof rules are formalized natural deduction style, the above meta-level implication can be read as an intuitionistic sequent where the Fi are the hypotheses. Isabelle has resolution tactics which apply the natural deduction rules in a way the maintains this illusion of working with sequents.
3 The Translation
Language and Logical Foundation
Whelk without @ is sorted intuitionistic rst-order logic with equality and I used this as the basis of the IsaWhelk theory. The only di erences are that Isabelle's calculus is natural deduction (as opposed to sequent) and is not sorted. The rst di erence is not theoretically important (since we don't intend to study the proof theory, e.g., cut-elimination properties, of Whelk) nor is it a practical concern since, as noted above, Isabelle maintains the illusion of working with a constructive sequent. As for sorts, Isabelle is simply typed at the meta-level, and these meta-level types enforce similar restrictions as Whelk's. Hence, in what follows, types are omitted. They are explicitly given in the Whelk system and automatically inferred in Isabelle.
The Whelk theory comes with \built-in" data-types/axioms for natural numbers and lists. There are standard Isabelle theories for these data-types that we employed. E.g., a theory of lists that contains the empty list ], cons \.", and standard axioms like induction. The Whelk axioms were not published but they are likely similar. To sum up, the language and theory of our IsaWhelk theory is constructive rst-order logic with equality extended with theories for numbers and lists. The exact formalization of these may be found in the standard Isabelle distribution (the theories IFOL, Nat2 and List) and the documentation 16]. I have extended this theory with two constants called Extract and Def with the property that Extract(P) = Def(P) = P for all formulas P; their role will be clari ed later.
Translating @
Rather than adding the operator @ and tags to our Isabelle theory and axiomatizing the corresponding Whelk rules, I instead translate this notation and derive corresponding rules. The translation shall capture that @ A represents the equivalence between A and a formula E which represents a program. In the goal, we do not know what E will be | it is to be constructed | so initially it is simply a meta-variable. In the rules, it is a combination of meta-variables that explains how to construct E from proofs of the subgoals. Below I expand on this and give examples.
Translation in the Speci cation Conjecture
@ A in the initial goal is translated to A <-> Extract (?E(x1, ..., xn)) where the xi are the variables bound in the outer scope of A. The xi are necessary as formulas substituted for E should be able to reference such bound variables; this requires that E is second-order and takes the bound variables as arguments (as substitution is capture avoiding). For example, consider the subset speci cation which will constitute our synthesis example later.
8l:8m:@ (8z:z 2 l ! z 2 m) (2) The synthesized program will be a function of l and m but not z. In Isabelle, we represent this as follows.
The \?" symbol indicates metavariables in Isabelle. Note that the restriction in Whelk that @ appears exactly once in a formula of the form 8x:@ (S(x)) is unimportant in our setting. We could reason about multiple equivalences or conditional speci cations.
Translation in the Rules
Formulas involving @ have associated tags that say how to build an equivalent formula. Tagged hypotheses look like @ A]] P(x)$ whereas tagged conclusions have the tag placed around the entire sequent. Given a formula @ A with associated tag ]] P(x)$ , we remove the tag and translate @ A to A <-> Ext, where Ext represents . Hence, we simply eliminate the tag and express the equivalence directly in our logic. Moreover, we do away with the predicate name P as it is not needed, except for recursive calls, and we will present our solution to this problem shortly.
As an example, consider the Whelk rule for^-I in the presence of @ . which is Isabelle's way of representing the following natural deduction rule.
The above rule is derived (recall that Extract(P) = P) in one step with Isabelle's simpli cation tactic for intuitionistic logic, so it is a valid rule. In 4.1 I argue it faithfully implements the Whelk rule. Note that this rule is initially postulated with free variables like A and ExtA which are treated as constants during proof of the rule; this prevents their premature instantiation during proof, which would lead to a proof of something more specialized. When the proof is completed, these variables are replaced by metavariables. Unfortunately, the translation is not completely uniform because Wiggins' did not use his notation in a completely consistent way. The @ operator is supposed to indicate what parts of the speci cation should contribute to the synthesized program (see Section 3.3 of 20] ) yet the logic includes rules for manipulating tagged formulas without this operator. Consider the Whelk rule \axiom". (Incidentally, this rule is not needed in our IsaWelk theory as it is a special case of Isabelle's standard assumption rule (applied with \assume tac") which uni es the goal against an assumption.) The Whelk elimination rules and substitution rules also required this kind of translation. This revealed a problem with the substitution rule, discussed in 3.3.
There are two other subtleties in the translation | parameter variables and recursive naming | which I clarify below.
Predicate Parameters and Variable Environments Whelk rules manipulate \environments" of variables (arguments to the de ned predicate P, i.e., E in the above) which represent parameters of the synthesized predicate. I simplify this by listing parameters up front as bound variables to which the meta-variables in the starting goal are applied. For example, l and m in the subset speci cation. Such parameters need not be mentioned in the rules themselves (with one exception noted shortly) as Isabelle's higher-order uni cation properly propagates these parameters to subgoals. I explain this below.
Isabelle automatically lifts rules during higher-order resolution (see 14, 15] ); this is a sound way of dynamically matching types of meta-variables during uni cation by applying them to new universally quanti ed parameters when necessary. This idea is best explained by an example. Consider applying the derived @^-I rule to the following (made-up) goal. In IsaWhelk, we begin proving goals by \setting up a context" where initial universally quanti ed variables become eigenvariables.
de nitions. That is, the context contains not only axioms for de ned function symbols (e.g., like In in the subset example) but it also contains a meta-variable that is instantiated during induction with new predicate de nitions.
Back to the subset example; our starting goal actually includes a context which de nes the axioms for In and includes a variable ?H (\wrapped" by Def) which expands to a de nition or series of de nitions. These will be called from the program that instantiates ?E.
The wrappers Extract and Def (recall these are the identity) restrict which IsaWhelk rules will unify against them. Without them, ?H and ?E would unify against everything and could be trivially instantiated by standard Isabelle tactics. By wrapping them uni cation is restricted to assumptions and rules that also contain explicitly wrapped variables (e.g., @^-I above). This is further discussed in 4. In this rule, E 0 is the binding environment at the time of application of the rule, and P 0 is de ned by P 0 (E 0 ) $ x = ]^ _ 9v 0 :9v 1 :x = v 0 jv 1 ]^ : This corresponds to the following derived rule which builds the program P(x,y), which represents P 0 (E); the rst assumption sets up a new schematic de nition for this program and the second and third correspond to the induction cases of the Whelk rule.
| Def(ALL x y. P(x,y) <-> (x = ] & EA(y)) | (EX v0 v1. x = v0.v1 & EB(v0,v1,y))); ALL y. A( ],y) <-> Extract(EA(y)); !!m. ALL y. A(m,y) <-> Extract(P(m,y)) ==> ALL h y. A(h.m,y) <-> Extract(EB(h,m,y)) |] ==> A(x,y) <-> Extract(P(x,y))
As in 1] we have written a tactic that applies such induction rules. Its resolution with the goal creates three subgoals (corresponding to the three assumptions above) but the rst is immediately discharged by unifying against a Def (?H) in the context which sets up a recursive de nition. This is precisely the role that Def (?H) serves. Actually, to allow for multiple recursive de nitions, the induction tactic rst duplicates the Def (?H) 7 before resolving with the induction rule. Also, it thins out (weakens) the instantiated de nition in the two remaining subgoals.
There is an additional subtlety in the induction rule which concerns parameter arguments. Other rules did not take additional parameters but this is the exception; here P takes two arguments even though the induction is on only one of them. This is necessary as the rule must establish (in the rst assumption) a de nition for a predicate with a xed number of universally quanti ed parameters and the number of these cannot be predicted at the time of the induction. My solution to this problem is ad hoc; I derive in Isabelle a separate induction rule for each number of arguments needed in practice (two are needed for the predicates synthesized in the subset example). Less ad hoc solutions exist; e.g., a tactic could uniformly generate such rules and their proofs in Isabelle, but this is not an interesting problem.
Errors Uncovered by the Translation
I translated and derived most of Whelks rules as described above. The Whelk rules are listed in Appendix A (ordered as in 20] ) and their translations in Appendix B. The translated rules are given with their names, which are bound to ML identi ers for use during proof construction.
Most rules were easily translated and derived, analogous to @^-I rule above. Below are the rules which require some explanation as they involve non-obvious parameter manipulation or the translation/derivation revealed problems with the given Whelk rule. The proofs for the derivable rules were usually constructed automatically using Isabelle's standard proof procedure for intuitionistic logic. @ 8-I 20] gives two forms of 8 introduction involving @ , distinguishing between 8 outside and inside the scope of @ (see Appendix A) . In IsaWhelk the rst is not necessary given our translation of parameters; 8- As @ A occurs within the scope of 8x the premise is translated as ALL x.A(x) <-> Extract(Ext(x)). In the conclusion, the variable x replaced by an arbitrary t; this may be modeled by letting x be a meta-variable which can later be uni ed to some t. In Isabelle this is accomplished by stating the rule with a constant x and after derivation x is generalized to a meta-variable. The extension of the variable environment E 00 with t means that in the synthesized fragment P the variable x receives the same instantiation. Hence the conclusion translates to A(x) <-> Extract(Ext(x)) and the IsaWhelk rule is
which is indeed derivable. If the reader nds this translation confusing, he may nd it helpful to re ect on the axiom for standard 8 
-E in Isabelle which is (ALL x.F(x)) ==> F(x)
What about the rst rule? As the universally quanti ed variable is within the scope of @ it cannot be an argument to the synthesized program fragment. I.e., the premise of the inference rule must be (All x. A(x)) <-> Extract(Ext) with Ext not dependent on x. The conclusion, as in the second rule, extends the environment of the synthesized predicate P with t. I.e., the synthesized fragment is to be instantiated. This translates to A(x) <-> Extract(Ext(x)). But we cannot combine these into
The problem is that Isabelle's type checker assigns di erent types to the Ext in the premise and the conclusion (one is a function, the other isn't). This is not merely a problem caused by restrictions in Isabelle; a real problem has been revealed, which could also be observed by close inspection of the Whelk rule. That is, the predicate P being de ned cannot be instantiated by t since there is no corresponding variable to be instantiated. That is, the universally quanti ed variable x is within, not without @ and the predicate P cannot be de ned in terms of this variable.
Tagged Formulas without @ In 3.2 I noted that the Whelk notation is not used consistently as there are rules manipulating tagged formulas without the @ operator (i.e., axiom, @ _ ?E, induction, sub, rewrite, and lemma in Appendix A) . I translated these as if the goal formulas were headed by @ and this led to derivable rules and was consistent with intention of Whelk to synthesize programs for such formulas. The only problem that arose is that the substitution rule was invalid under this interpretation.
The Whelk substitution rule is the following. It is hard to imagine what was intended by this rule. I have omitted it; it is not necessary for proof construction.
Correctness of Translation and Extensions

Adequacy and Faithfulness of Encoding
I have used Isabelle to formally establish the correctness of the translated rules when this was the case. But do these rules really model the Whelk rules? That is, is there a bijection between Whelk proofs and IsaWhelk proofs that respects our interpretation of @ and constructs the same program.
No such bijection exists if we allow unrestricted use of Isabelle's rules in constructing IsaWhelk proofs. That is, Isabelle has more rules available than Whelk (we needn't consider tactics here as these expand to sequences of primitive rules), in particular, rules for manipulating Isabelle's metalogic. For example, we may directly instantiate an Isabelle meta-variable rather than instantiate it using uni cation during resolution with an IsaWhelk rule; this has no counterpart in Whelk as there are no meta-variables present and extraction is manipulated out of reach of the user.
If we restrict ourself to \core" IsaWhelk, consisting of the application of the rules of rst-order logic (by the resolution tactics or simpli ers) and resolution using the IsaWhelk rules, then the correspondence holds. 10 This must be established by induction on proofs analyzing each proof rule case-by-case. Such a proof is straightforward but tedious. We sketch part of one case here for concreteness.
Consider the @^-I rule from 3.2.2. Let @ (A^B) be a formula in a Whelk proof to which @^-I is applied. That is, we prove @ (A^B) building the program P(E) $ ^ from proofs of @ A and @ B which have built programs P(E) $ and P(E) $ respectively. Assume for concreteness that E is 8 The rule in 20] contained a typo. Wiggins tells me that this rule has now been deleted from Whelk. 9 Here is a countermodel. , and = = False; the assumptions are true but the conclusion is false. 10 Overlooking a trivial di erence: in Whelk the constructed program P(x) $ always must be named (i.e., P) whereas names are only created in IsaWhelk by applying the induction rule. However, this can be viewed as a feature of IsaWhelk rather than a bug. In Whelk, extra dummy predicates end up being de ned, e.g., when a proof begins with an induction.
the vector of variables x 1 : : :x k . This Whelk step translates directly to an IsaWhelk step. The goal proved translates to A & B <-> Extract (?E(x1, ..., xk) . We resolve this with the corresponding IsaWhelk rule (WAndI) and Isabelle lifts this rule over the parameters x1, ..., xk. The lifted rule produces the two subgoals A <-> Extract(?EA(x1, ..., xk)) and B <-> Extract(?EB(x1, ..., xk)) and uni es ?E(x1, ..., xk) to ?EA(x1, ..., xk) & ?EB(x1, ..., xk). But these are just the translations of the corresponding Whelk subgoals and we have produced the same program fragment in both cases. Arguing the bijection in the other direction (the IsaWhelk rule to the Whelk rule) is similar. The above argument should not be surprising. The IsaWhelk rules are simply the natural deduction implementation of the Whelk rules where equivalence and the Extract label are used to indicate Whelk's tags. The only essential di erence is the way we handle bound variables and lifting accounts for the correspondence here. Despite this simple correspondence, I nd that casting the Whelk rules as rst-order rules makes them easier to understand and reason about.
Note that Extract and Def wrappers play an important role in the above. Without them, the metavariables they surround could become accidentally instantiated in an IsaWhelk proof. For example, we could prove any theorem by assumption since we have a meta-variable in our assumption list which could match any goal. The Extract label ensures that the only way to build an extraction is with the speci c IsaWhelk rules that manipulate these tagged formulas. Similarly, the Induction rules are the only ones that set up new de nitions and can instantiate Def wrapped variables.
Decidability
Given the above, any property holding for Whelk programs also holds for IsaWhelk programs. One such property, called \decidability" is presented in 20] . Before examining this though, we consider more generally what properties we might desire from programs synthesized through IsaWhelk or Whelk proofs.
In IsaWhelk it is explicit that proofs may extend a context with new de nitions and hence are proofs under assumption. If the assumptions synthesized are inconsistent, the predicate may not de ne the relation expected. This is also the case in Whelk; in both, we wish that the predicates we de ne really de ne mathematical relations. This is analogous to proofs in provers like Boyer-Moore NQTHM prover 3] where, when users de ne functions, the system checks to see if these really de ne total functions. In the case of NQTHM this is demonstrated by showing termination. That is, recursive function calls are on arguments smaller in some well-founded order. I prove something analogous here. with two subgoals that serve to instantiate EA and EB. In the rst goal, the base-case, we must prove 8y:A( ]; y) $ Extract(EA(y)) without additional assumptions. So EA(y) cannot reference the named predicate P as it is not a part of the context of this goal. In the second subgoal we must prove 8h y:A(h:m; y) $ Extract(EB(h; m; y) ) under the assumption 8y:A(m; y) $ Extract(P(m; y) ) with m an eigenvariable. Here now is the essence of the proof: if we wish to instantiate EB(h; m; y) with a term containing the recursive call, that recursive call must be of the form P(m; t) for some term t. Critically though, m is xed (an eigenvariable) and hence there is a well-founded order that the recursive call is smaller on; namely the rst argument (the argument we did induction on) is smaller in the order given by the induction schema.
2 Note that this theorem is weaker than saying that the de ned predicate, when executed as a logic program, will terminate on all-ground queries. But this holds as a corollary when the rules meet certain simple syntactic conditions. That is when all base relations (e.g., True and False and also equality) are associated with recursive procedures and the non-inductive proof rules combine predicates with operators whose truth we can decide via (taking boolean combinations of) the truth of the subcomponents. This is the case for the IsaWhelk and Whelk rules. As for the induction rule, the theorem above indicates calls are on smaller arguments so evaluation of these will terminate. Note that only the induction rule introduces quanti ers into the program body but these are existential quanti ers which appear in formulas of the form 9v 0 v 1 :x = v 0 :v 1 : : : which can trivially be decided (or compiled out in the translation to Horn clauses).
The above properties are di erent though from the \decidability criteria" that 20] claims for Whelk.
Whelk rules are said to preserve decidability, in the sense that if @ A is proven then we know A _ :A. The proof of this property (labeled \Correctness of Synthesis Logic" in Section 3.6) is the following:
Theorem: The rules of Whelk including @ are correct with respect to the interpretation of @ .
Proof: By de nition,`@ A i `A _ :A. Rewrite any Whelk rule under this equivalence. The resulting rule is necessarily derivable from the rules of LJ ;= . It seems, however, what is really desired is that we have an e ective way of executing the bodies of our pure logic programs. 20] explains:
In order to ensure that we can derive a program from the proof, and to ensure that the program is then executable, we must place restrictions on the proof system we use. The most straightforward way to achieve the necessary restriction is to require that the logic we use for the proof be constructive. I believe termination is best argued as I have above. Furthermore, my account does not rely on the fact that the proof system is constructive. We can use excluded middle to reason about the equivalence between a program and its speci cation; what is important is the syntactic form of the program, as discussed above.
Extensions
The above discussion highlights what we require from our rules, and hence suggests how we could enhance and extend IsaWhelk. The equivalence criteria stipulates that the IsaWhelk rules must form a calculus of equivalence reasoning. Additional criteria can be formalized for example to ensure that programs terminate in all ground mode. Or perhaps additionally, that they don't contain negation or other operators that might e ect their behavior in other modes. When these criteria are reducible to syntactic properties of the programs synthesized, they may be easily checked for any IsaWhelk rule, or extension we might make.
As one example, we may choose to add new base predicates. Since equality is a part of most programming logic languages, we have added the rules EqInstance and UnEqInstance to IsaWhelk. These are A = B <-> Extract(A = B) and~(A = B) <-> Extract(~ (A = B) ) respectively. These rules are trivially derived (de nition expansion). As another example, we may form new rules in Isabelle by using resolution to combine given rules. If we know that the original rules are correct, then their composition is also correct, both logically, and under syntactically based citeria (e.g., avoiding negation, etc.) we have established.
5 Program Development I illustrate program synthesis in IsaWhelk using the subset relation example given in 20]. The proof I give closely follows the proof outline (Wiggins gave only selected steps) there. The example illustrates the translation and how IsaWhelk proofs re ect Whelk proofs. It also illustrates the schematic proof idea, and the bene ts of building on top of a system like Isabelle that has a well developed tactic collection.
The entire proof required 15 steps and is given in Appendix C along with comments. Here I replay Isabelle's response to these proof steps, i.e., the instantiated top-level goal and subgoals that it generates after each step. The output is taken directly from an Isabelle session except, to save space, I have combined a couple steps, \pretty printed" formulas, and abbreviated variable names (e.g., contracting ExtB11 to EB11).
The proof begins by giving Isabelle the subset speci cation (see 3.2) . Isabelle prints back the goal to be proved (at the top) and the subgoals necessary to establish it. As the proof proceeds, the theorem becomes specialized as ?H is incrementally instantiated with our program. We have also given the names inbase and instep to the context assumptions that de ne the membership predicate In. The rst proof step, invoked by the tactic SetUpContext, moves the de nition variable ?H into the assumption context and, as discussed in 3.2.2, promotes universally quanti ed variables to eigenvariables so our IsaWhelk rules may be used via lifting.
Finally we complete this step by applying Isabelle's predicate-calculus simpli cation routines augmented with the formula inbase. We are left with the following step case (which is now the top goal on the stack and hence numbered 1).
come to mind) provide excellent foundations for program synthesis. As they formalize rules, we can give formal accounts of the correctness of calculi (e.g., see 19] for an account of a logic for reasoning about rst-order program schemata). As they feature higher-order uni cation, we may build programs incrementally during proof, where meta-variables and binding operators properly interact. As they feature tactic languages, or other kinds of automation support, we may quickly apply the logics we embed to problems of reasonable complexity.
These lessons are general, but the formalization of logic programming calculi is particularly simple since the programming language is a sublanguage of the speci cation language. In general, we do not require that speci cations are executable or even rst-order. Moreover, the equivalence between speci cations and programs need not be proven constructively. For example, IsaWhelk programs could have been developed in classical rst-order logic (all the proof construction rules we used are derivable there too); all that matters is that the rules build programs from an appropriate (e.g., Horn) subset of the speci cation language.
Other authors have argued that rst-order logic is the proper foundation for reasoning about and transforming logic programs (e.g., 6, 5] ). Our work corroborates this, although it demonstrates too that there is a role for logical frameworks as rst-order logic is to weak to formalize rst-order proof rules (as such rules contain variables ranging over formulas). But there are bene ts also to using even richer logics to manipulate rst-order, and possibly higher-order, speci cations. For example, in this paper I used a recursion schema corresponding to structural induction over lists. But for synthesizing logic programs with more complicated kinds of recursion (e.g., quick sort) we require general well-founded induction where the user may suggest an appropriate well-founded ordering. But formalizing well-foundedness requires quantifying over sets or predicates and, outside of set-theory, this is generally second-order. Exploring synthesis based on well-founded induction in a higher-order setting is a direction for future work.
